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SECTION IV:
EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE OFFERED
BY THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT,
NOT SO FAST
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence and
Repressed Memory Evidence When
Offered by the Accused
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary purposes of the American court system is to
work diligently to bring about some semblance of fairness and justice to
those who have been legally wronged. In order to make our system fair,
our laws dictate that everyone is entitled to adequate counsel, and more
importantly, the right to present a defense. In spite of these guarantees,
it appears that defendants that attempt to use polygraph or repressed
memory evidence are in some circumstances often precluded from
presenting their defenses because of the purported inadequacy of the evi-
dence compromising their cases.
With regard to polygraph evidence, the overall consensus of courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, is that polygraph evidence is
too unreliable to be admitted into evidence. Courts have generally
decided that admission of this evidence will not serve to assist the finder
-of fact to come to a decision regarding guilt or innocence. Moreover,
courts have expressed a distrust of such evidence because there has yet
to be a consensus in the scientific community concerning its validity.
The fears often expressed by the courts regarding the evidence include
concern that: questions of reliability may confuse the jury; the jury
might focus more on the polygraph evidence instead of on the issues at
stake; and the jury might give undue weight to the evidence. Although
these fears are valid, the courts appear to adopt a less fearful attitude
towards polygraph evidence depending on the party whom the evidence
benefits.
Although the outcome of the cases that are analyzed below may be
coincidental, there is a strong indication that the admissibility of poly-
graph evidence is heavily dependent upon which party benefits from its
admittance. As will be shown in this Comment, when the polygraph
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evidence will benefit the defendant, the court usually rules against
admissibility. In cases where the evidence benefits the prosecution,
however, the norm is to admit the evidence. Furthermore, even if the
evidence is admitted and this is later found to be error on appeal, if the
evidence is against the defendant's interest, it is generally found to be
"harmless error." Interestingly, the analyses of the reliability issue
appears to be very similar in each case, despite the fact the difference in
outcome. Unfortunately, the defendant is normally precluded from sub-
mitting evidence from a polygraph exam when that evidence assists to
bolster his credibility or to prove his case.
In contrast to the defendant's plight with regard to polygraph evi-
dence, another issue involving the reliability of controversial evidence
concerns repressed memory testimony. With repressed memory, the dif-
ferences in the outcomes are not as obvious. The reason for this differ-
ence may be that the theory of repressed memory is fairly new and still
under a significant amount of scrutiny. Another reason may be that nor-
mally, the defendant is not the individual presenting repressed memory
evidence (it is often the plaintiff who has "remembered" an offense
against him). As a result, the case law concerning repressed memory of
the defendant is not as extensive as that of polygraph evidence.
Ironically, the leading Supreme Court decision concerning this
issue involved a defendant's repressed memory. The Court held that a
defendant, who has no other practical method of presenting a defense,
may use repressed memory testimony in his case in chief. Even after
this ruling, however, several courts have decided against allowing
repressed memory testimony. With repressed memory, it appears that
for the defendant, as well as for the plaintiff, the admissibility of
repressed memory evidence appears to be left purely to chance.
Although there does not appear to be a pattern of rulings, as with poly-
graph evidence, admission of this evidence for the prosecution would
nevertheless place the defendant in a very difficult decision for reasons
discussed in this Comment.
Although our court system professes to be fair to all, in reality,
"fairness" tends to be what is more favorable to the prosecution than to
the defendant. In spite of the fact that the judgments in these cases
appear to work against a defendant's ability to present his defense, this
issue has yet to be raised in the courts. The following analysis of these
cases presents the idea that if we are to truly have a system of "fairness."
Perhaps this issue should be raised.
II. POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
As discussed above, there are many issues concerning the topic of
[Vol. 55:975
2001]POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE AND REPRESSED MEMORY EVIDENCE 977
polygraph evidence ranging from the reliability of the science of polyg-
raphy to the constitutional right' of an accused individual to use
whatever means acceptable to present a defense.2 In spite of recent deci-
sions, there are still several courts that continue to exercise a per se ban
on the admissibility of polygraph evidence because of the controversies
regarding the science and the lack of agreement among those in the field
on the reliability of the results.'
This issue has caused a split among the various state and federal
courts, while the military currently lives under a different and more
absolute rule. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Scheffer4 that
the per se rule against admission of polygraph evidence in court martial
proceedings did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights of the
accused to present a defense.5 While this holding is not binding on state
and federal courts, as the Court was careful not to do, it nevertheless
may signal the direction of the Supreme Court should another case come
forward on a similar issue. The Court, however, left several issues open
and unanswered that this Comment will address.
This first major part of this Comment will discuss the science of
polygraphy and how it works (or how it does not work, depending on the
perspective), and the history of the issue of polygraph admissibility,
beginning with Frye v. United States.6 Following will be the supposed
death of Frye in light of the more recent Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals7 holding and how the new Daubert standard has been
applied to subsequent cases. The Comment then discusses Scheffer,8
where the Supreme Court upheld the per se rule of inadmissibility of
polygraph evidence in court-martial proceedings, and its implications
and complications for future cases. The post-Scheffer case law discussed
1. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
2. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussed infra Part II.G.); see
also United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that polygraph
evidence is no longer per se inadmissible); Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987)
(changing from the per se rule of inadmissibility to allow polygraph related evidence in
circumstances where "it is relevant to the proof developed by the probative evidence").
3. See United States v. Messina, 131 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1997); see also State v. Porter, 698
A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997); Perkins v. State, 902 S.W.2d 88, 94-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
4. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
5. Id. at 309.
6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussed, infra, in section II.C.).
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
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will be analyzed from the perspective of the defendant to determine if
the evidence is treated differently when proffered by the accused. This
part of the Comment concludes with a discussion of the future of poly-
graph evidence and its potential influence on American jurisprudence.
A. The Science of Polygraphy
In the early development of the procedures that were designed to
detect the truthfulness of the person being examined, tests consisted of
measuring changes in the subject's systolic blood pressure.9 Since then,
advances in modem technology have led to the ability to detect and
record, by the way of graphs (hence the term "polygraph"), changes in
various bodily functions such as blood pressure and respiration.' ° In
fact, there has been research indicating that, "when given under con-
trolled conditions, the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or
deception between seventy and ninety percent of the time.""I
The polygraph test consists of several tools that are used to measure
the examinee's physiological responses to questions. A polygraph
instrument will collect physiological data from at least three of the sys-
tems in the human body.'" Rubber tubes are often placed over the
examinee's chest and abdominal area to record respiration.' 3 Two metal
plates, attached to the fingers, will record sweat gland activity."' The
tools are used to record the responses on a chart that is later interpreted
by the examiner. Other instruments that are used to detect the responses
of the examinee include cardiographs, pneumographs, and cardio-cuffs
to measure the heart rate, pulse of the examinee, and blood pressure.'"
While there is no doubt that the instruments used can accurately measure
changes in the targeted responses, the doubt emerges when the possible
reasons for the changes are interpreted.
The entire foundation of the science of polygraphy is grounded in
the assumption that everyone reacts in a manner that causes them to
9. See Frye, 293 F. at 1913.
10. "Modem instrumentation detects changes in the subject's blood pressure, pulse, thoracic
and abdominal respiration, and galvanic skin response." United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428,
434 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 5169 n.7 (1978)).
11. Id. at 434 (citing Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1989)). "Even
the most ardent polygraph detractors cite accuracy rates of 70 percent." Id. 434 n.7.
12. See American Polygraph Association, The Validity and Reliability of Polygraph Testing,
(Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.polygraph.org/apa5.htm.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Timothy B. Henseler, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in
the Wake of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 1247, 1251-52
(1997).
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exhibit some physiological signs of distress or anxiety when they are
saying something untrue.' 6 This assumption alone is problematic, as it
is not possible to ascertain whether every person reacts the same to
lying. Furthermore, this foundation assumes that the examiner will be
able to accurately distinguish between a lie and other possible reasons
for the physiological changes.
The proponents of polygraph examinations admit that the responses
the tests are designed to measure are triggered when an examinee know-
ingly makes a false statement.' 7 There are several other factors, how-
ever, that have been presented as being possible causes for a change in
the measured responses. For example, nervousness and frustration could
just as easily cause a measurable change in the monitored body func-
tions as lying would. 8 Because of these possibilities and uncertainties,
some authorities argue that the main key to valid examination results
will be the skill, experience, education, and integrity of the examiner in
interpreting the results of the test, not just the test itself.'9 The reality
behind the validity of the results seems best described by one author
who states, "A properly tuned piano is an instrument upon which it is
theoretically possible to play the 'Moonlight Sonanta,' but whether we
get that or 'Chopsticks' depends upon who is seated at the keyboard."2
Another issue regarding the validity of polygraph examination is
the idea that there have been proven countermeasures that could "fool"
the test and, consequently, the examiner."' Examples of countermea-
sures that are used by individuals taking a polygraph include ingesting
muscle relaxers or cutting themselves right before an exam in an incon-
spicuous place.22 The muscle relaxers help individuals to calm them-
selves and can consequently prevent them from getting too excited when
asked certain questions. The cut will be a distracting pain that will allow
the examinee to focus on something else and prevent certain physiologi-
cal responses. These countermeasures are not 100% effective, but there
16. Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 585-86 (D. Conn. 1996) (detailing the proffered
traditional theory behind the polygraph examination).
17. Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1983).
18. See id. at 91. The Farmer court cited examples of frustration, surprise, pain, shame, and
embarrassment, in addition to other responses that could explain the changes in an examinee's
physical functions.
19. Id.; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5169.
20. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5169.
21. See W. Thomas Halbleib, Note, United States v. Piccinonna- The Eleventh Circuit Adds
Another Approach to Polygraph Evidence in the Federal System, 80 Ky. L. J. 225, 229 (1992).
As stated by Halbleib, "Any poker player knows that if his mouth goes dry, his voice trembles, his
fact blushes, and he begins to sweat every time he tries to bluff his way into a big pot, he probably
will lose. Good players learn to control and manipulate these physiological signs to their benefit."
Id.
22. United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1538 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989).
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are verified accounts where these, as well as others, have helped an
examinee to "beat" the exam.23
Despite these possible countermeasures, the examiner is faced with
having to judge whether the examinee is telling the truth by comparing
the responses given to the questions against the reactions recorded in
order to decide whether the respondent is being truthful. So as it
appears, even the best designed test is still capable of being employed
for an invalid result because of the significant role the examiner plays
with the administration and interpretation of the exam. 4 The question
is: does the judiciary want to entrust what could be a significant piece of
the evidentiary puzzle to an arguably infallible machine, but a fallible
interpreter of the machine's information? While this question continues
to surface, courts have begun to steer away from the traditional per se
rule of inadmissibility and have begun opening the door for possible
inclusion based on the tests that are becoming more standardized and
widely used in government and employment arenas.
The recent admissibility of the tests seems to beg several questions.
Just because the tests are being used, does that necessarily mean that the
results are more often than not accurate? And, if the results are accurate,
to what extent should they be allowed as evidence? Also, are the courts
willing to risk the idea that a machine will effectively become a major
factor in determining the existence of liberty for accused individuals? In
accordance with the varied opinions of many scholars, the opinions of
the admissibility of polygraph evidence have also varied in the decisions
of the courts.
B. Polygraphy According to the Examiners
According to the American Polygraph Association ("APA"), the
word "polygraph" literally means "many writings." This refers to the
manner in which selected physiological activities are simultaneously
recorded. 5 The APA reports that there is significant polygraph evi-
dence that supports the high validity of the examination.26 In fact, the
APA reports that the accuracy of polygraph testing (when conducted
according to APA guildelines) ranges from eighty to ninety-eight per-
cent.27 The APA acknowledges that this range is attributable to the dif-
ferent training and requirements of polygraphers, in addition to other
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1540 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing research that
indicates that the experience of the examiner as well as the procedure used affects the accuracy of
the test results).
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varying elements that will be discussed in this Comment.
28
The actual testing guidelines of the APA, in abbreviated form,
include the following. During a pre-test phase of the examination, the
examiner completes the necessary paperwork and explains how the test
will be administered to the examinee.2 9 A chart collection phase where
the examiner administers and collects a number of polygraph charts then
follows.3" There are certain specific questions that that examiners are
not to ask during an examination. For example, during an employment
examination, the examiner should not ask about religious beliefs or
political beliefs.3 After the chart collection phase, the examiner then
analyzes the charts and renders an opinion as to the truthfulness of the
examinee. When appropriate, the examiner will ask the examinee to
present an explanation as to why he reacted in a certain manner.
3 2
The APA claims that the reason its accuracy figures vary from the
figures quoted by critics of polygraph testing is because critics often
include inconclusive tests in their error determinations, while the APA
does not.3 3 With the issue of errors in polygraph examinations, the APA
admits that the errors may be caused by the examiner's failure to prop-
erly prepare the examinee.34 In an effort to combat potential errors, the
APA encourages and teaches the use of various protective procedures.
These procedures include, but are not limited to, an assessment of the
examinee's emotional state, specialized tests to "identify the overly
responsive examinee and to calm the overly nervous," and quality con-
trol review.35
The APA admits to the existing problems with polygraph examina-
tion and reports to employ continuous methods to reduce the amount of
problems and the extent of uncertainty regarding the polygraph. The
APA, however, stands completely behind polygraph testing and its
validity, as long as the examiner is certified according to the APA crite-
ria and prerequisites. The information gathered also reported that the
admissibility of the polygraph evidence varies from state to state,36 but








35. Id. The APA does not provide a detailed explanation of "specialized tests" or the
elements of a quality control review in the information available to the public.
36. Although the information from the APA was gathered in November of 2000, there is no
mention of Scheffer on the website.
37. American Polygraph Association, supra note 12. "Polygraph results (or
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C. Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence Beginning with Frye
The first substantial case that was determinative of the issue of pol-
ygraph admissibility was Frye v. United States.38 In Frye, the trial court
refused to admit the results of a systolic blood pressure test.39 The Frye
court was given the task of determining whether to allow the use of the
evidence from the test to be admitted by the criminal defendant in order
to demonstrate his innocence in a murder trial.4 ° The court used the
"general acceptance" standard in order to determine the admissibility of
scientific or technical evidence in the context of the science of polygra-
phy.4" The test required the proponent of the evidence to show that the
science was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
from which it emerged.4" Using this theory, the Frye court decided that
the systolic blood pressure test did not embody a scientific principle that
was sufficiently reliable to allow the evidence to be admitted.
After Frye, many courts used the holding to determine the admissi-
bility of most evidence that fell under the scientific or technical
umbrella, but that was not widely known or accepted.43 There were
decisions, however, that moved away from the Frye and considered the
facts of each case on the individual merits as opposed to the per se rule
of inadmissibility of polygraph evidence enunciated in Frye.44 In Picci-
nonna, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Frye rule and rendered its own
test for determining the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The Picci-
nonna court reviewed the reasons other courts gave for not wanting to
admit polygraph evidence and concluded that because of the advances in
the science of polygraphy, the examination had become accepted "as a
useful and reliable scientific tool."
45
D. The Beginning of the Erosion of Frye-The Piccinonna Decision
In Piccinonna, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Frye rule and ren-
dered its own test for determining the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence. The Piccinonna court reviewed the reasons other courts gave for
psychophysiological detection of deception examinations) are admissible in some federal circuits
and some states. More often, such evidence is admissible where the parties have agreed to their
admissibility before the examination given, under terms of a stipulation." Id. (citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
38. 29 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
39. Id. at 1014. This blood pressure test was considered a crude predecessor to the polygraph
examination of today.
40. Id. at 1013.
41. Id. at 1014.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 303 (1998).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11 th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 1535.
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not wanting to admit polygraph evidence and concluded, that because of
the advances in the science of polygraphy, the examination had become
accepted "as a useful and reliable scientific tool."46 Instead of a per se
rule, the Piccinonna court decided that courts would determine ad hoc
the need of the relevant evidence in comparison to the possibility of the
unfair prejudice that may result from its use at trial.4 7 The court went on
to further dismantle Frye by giving examples of the permissible
instances of polygraph evidence.48 These involved the advance stipula-
tion between the parties before polygraph evidence would be admitted
and the use of the evidence to impeach or corroborate a witness's testi-
mony.49 Regarding the first instance, the court stated that if the parties
agreed in advance to the testing and what will be admissible from the
test, the court might allow the evidence. 0
The Eleventh Circuit did not just stop at allowing polygraph evi-
dence in the event of a stipulation. A second permissible use would be
for the impeachment or corroboration of testimony if three requisite con-
ditions are satisfied. 5' First, the party offering the evidence must pro-
vide notice to the opposing party that it intends to offer expert testimony
regarding polygraph examination.52 Second, the opposing party must
have the opportunity to conduct its own examination. 53 Third, Federal
Rule of Evidence 60814 would govern all determinations as to whether
the evidence will actually impeach or corroborate the testimony of the
witness. 5 Even if these three prerequisites are satisfied, the decision
whether to admit polygraph evidence still remains within the discretion
of the trial judge.56
E. The Death of Frye at the Hand of Daubert?
After the Eleventh Circuit in Piccinonna began the erosion of Frye
by introducing its own test for the possible admissibility of polygraph




49. Id. at 1536.
50. Id. "[C]ircumstances must indicate that the parties agree on material matters such as the
manner in which the test is the conducted, nature of the questions asked, and the identity of the




54. "[E]vidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." FED. R. EvrD.
608(a)(2).
55. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
56. Id.
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Rule of Evidence 70257 overruled Frye with regard to the admissibility
of expert testimony, and, consequently, the admissibility of polygraph
evidence.58 The Court stated that when there is a proffer of expert testi-
mony, it is the role of the trial judge to determine if, under Federal Rule
of Evidence 104(a),59 the expert is testifying to what is: (1) scientific
knowledge; and (2) what will be useful to help the fact finder in under-
standing or determining a fact that is in issue.6 °
The Court continued by presenting four factors that might be help-
ful for the trial judge in determining whether the evidence being prof-
fered is scientifically valid.6" The factors suggested include: (1) whether
the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the the-
ory or technique has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; (4) the exis-
tence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's opera-
tion; and (5) whether the technique has gained general acceptance within
the relevant scientific community. 62 The emphasis behind these sug-
gested guidelines was that the trial judge had a "gatekeeping" job that
was to ensure the reliability and relevancy of the information being
offered. 6 3 This gatekeeping role was designed to give sufficient discre-
tion to the trial judge in order to avoid problems for the fact finder in
subsequent proceedings.64
F. Admissibility of Polygraphy Under Daubert
After Daubert, the issue of the admissibility of polygraphy can now
be analyzed using the suggested factors enunciated by the Supreme
Court. The first factor, whether the theory has been tested, problemati-
cally begins the analysis. There are three main types of techniques used
for polygraph examinations,65 and the scientific community has been
57. FED. R. EvID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise."
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 303, 587-89 (1993).
59. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
60. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
61. Id. at 593.
62. Id. at 593-94.
63. Id. at 597.
64. Id.
65. See United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 813 (11 th Cir. 1998). The three main types of
polygraph examinations are the "Relevant/Irrelevant Technique," the "Concealed or Guilty
Knowledge Technique," and the "Control Question Technique." Id. The Relevant/Irrelevant
Technique is a test where the examiner asks questions that are both relevant and irrelevant to the
[Vol. 55:975
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unable to determine which, if any, is the most reliable to use. 66 In addi-
tion, the physiological responses being measured, as well as the counter-
measures that may be employed, have led to problems with determining
the consistent reliability of the tests.6 7
The second prong of the analysis under Daubert, (i.e. whether the
technique has been subjected to peer review), seeks to uncover whether
well-known members of the scientific community have commented on
the reliability of the technique of polygraphy. Because of the substantial
controversy surrounding the issue, this is one prong of the Daubert test
that has no problem being met because there have been several articles
and publications on the subject of polygraphy. 68 There is one problem
with this prong - the mere fact that something has been written about a
technique theory does not necessarily mean that the technique or theory
is reliable. How long did the "scholars" of yesterday write and comment
about the world being flat?
The third and fourth prongs of Daubert are directly related: the
known error rate of the technique and the standard operating procedure.
These factors are also difficult issues to address. There have been vari-
ous studies conducted that have reported error rates with varying
results. 69  To further complicate matters, error rates for polygraphy
involve false positives and false negatives.7° A false positive is an error
that indicates that a subject is lying when he is actually being truthful. A
issue at hand. Id. The theory is that the examinee will have a different response that will be
associated with lying. Id. The scientific community has largely rejected this technique. Id. The
Concealed or Guilty Knowledge Technique is a test where the examiner tests the examinee's
response to information that only the perpetrator of the crime would know. Id. The theory behind
this technique is that a guilty examinee will recognize the question that could incriminate him and
will therefore have a psychophysiological response to that item. Id. The Control Question
Technique is where the examiner asks both questions relevant to the purpose of the examination
and control questions. Id. The control questions involve issues unrelated to the examination and
depending on the technique used, the examinee will either be tricked or directed to give a false
answer to each of the control questions. Id. The theory is that the innocent examinee will have a
stronger physiological response to his false responses to the control questions as compared to his
truthful answers where he denies the wrongdoing. Id.
66. See United States v. Pitner, 969 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (stating that the
American Medical Association has questioned the reliability of polygraph examinations).
67. See David Gallai, Note, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should It Be Admissible,
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 94 n.45 (1999) (citing to Lisa Davis's attribution to Leonard Saxe, a
lead analyst of a study of polygraphs done at Congress's request, the opinion that "the polygraph
simply shows whether a question makes someone anxious, and there are a thousand and one
reasons that explain why a person hooked up to a polygraph might become anxious.").
68. See generally Pitner, 969 F. Supp. at 1250-51 (explaining that polygraphy had been the
subject of extensive peer review and publications).
69. See Allison Kornet, The Truth About Lying: Has Lying Gotten a Bad Rap?, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, May 15, 1997, at 52, 56. "The best-controlled research suggests that lie detectors err at a
rate anywhere from 25 to 75 percent." Id.
70. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp 877, 885 (D. N.M. 1995).
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false negative indicates a subject is being truthful when he is lying.
Studies have shown that there are more false positives than there are
false negatives.7 ' The existence of the error rate can be a result of a
combination of factors, such as the ambiguity of the questions asked, the
experience of the examiner, the accuracy of the testing mechanism itself,
etc.72
In terms of standard polygraph operating procedures, quite simply,
there are none.73 In addition, there are varied methods for training
examiners and for administering examinations. In fact, some states do
not even require licenses in order to become a polygraph examiner.74
There are also varied schools of thought with regard to the type of pre-
interview and post-interview questions that should be used to ensure
accurate results.75 In light of the significant role that the examiner has in
interpreting the validity of the results, this lack of uniformity seems to
be more than a little problematic.
The last prong of Daubert concerns the general acceptance of the
technique in the scientific community. The first question with regard to
this prong is, who would be considered a part of the relevant commu-
nity? Further, if two substantial organizations within that community
are at odds with the notion of acceptance, 76 which organization's opin-
ion carries the most weight? Does the mere fact that there is a difference
of opinion indicate there is no "general acceptance" in the scientific
community? Because there are different techniques for polygraphy,
there has been no unified acceptance of the science of polygraphy at all.
There are some experts who assert that the evidence of polygraphy is
reliable, while others in the field feel equally strong about the fact that
the reliability does not exist. 77 Based on this conflict, it is unreasonable
to propose that the science of polygraphy actually has achieved "general
acceptance" within the scientific community. As a result, this prong of
the Daubert test, lends to the movement toward inadmissibility.
G. Applying Daubert-Just Say No
After the Supreme Court enunciated the standards of Daubert, sev-
71. Id.
72. Gallai, supra note 67, at 98.
73. Id. at 99.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Charles Robert Honts & Bruce D. Quick, The Polygraph in 1995: Progress in Science
and the Law, 71 N.D. L. REV. 987, 992 (1995) (stating the Society of Psychophysiological
Research reports that two thirds of their members felt that polygraph results were reliable). The
American Medical Association has openly questioned the reliability of the examinations. See
supra note 66.
77. See generally Honts & Quick, supra note 76.
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eral circuits have used the case to continue to refuse the admissibility of
polygraph evidence. In United States v. Wright,78 a defendant requested
a polygraph examination and then stipulated to its admissibility, but the
court decided to exclude the results of the polygraph. Wright involved a
fire that destroyed a Wal-Mart department store.7 9 The defendant hired
legal counsel who encouraged him to take a polygraph examination in
an effort to prove his innocence."0 The defendant failed the test and the
prosecution sought to use the results as an attack on the defendant's
credibility.8
The court noted that it had concerns about the reliability of the
polygraph examination and the potential prejudicial effect that the
results might have on the jury.82 The court used the Daubert prong
relating to the lack of consensus on the reliability of polygraphy in the
scientific community to reject the evidence, in spite of the stipulation
and advances in the field.83 The court also noted, "The Eleventh Circuit
continues to consider polygraphy as 'a developing and inexact science'
and has noted that polygraph evidence should not be used in all situa-
tions where 'more proven types of expert testimony are allowed."84
Interestingly, the court observed that another reason for its decision was
the fact that the attorney representing the defendant was limited in his
criminal experience." This statement seems to indicate that had the
attorney been more experienced, he would have either: (1) not stipu-
lated to the admission of such evidence; or (2) not attempted to rely
upon such questionable evidence at all.
In United States v. Gilliard, the Eleventh Circuit followed suit by
deciding to uphold a district court's decision that the evidence offered
from the polygraph evidence was inadmissible.86 Gilliard concerned
allegations of false Medicare claims made by the defendant, a chief
executive officer of a medical diagnostic center.87 Gilliard agreed to
submit to a polygraph examination. The results of the examination indi-
cated that Gilliard was being truthful when he indicated he denied any
78. 22 F. Supp. 2d 751 (W.D. Tenn. 1998).
79. Id. at 753.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 755.
83. Id. at 754.
84. Id. at 755 (citing United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1535 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
85. Id.
86. United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 812 (11 th Cir. 1998) (citing Piccinonna, 885 F.2d
at 1535) ("polygraphy [is] a developing and inexact science" and has noted that polygraph
evidence should not be used in all situations where "more proven types of expert testimony are
allowed").
87. Id. at 811.
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wrongdoing.88 After his initial conviction, Gilliard appealed, citing that
the lower court should have admitted the polygraph results into evi-
dence. The lower court decided that the evidence was inadmissible and
cited the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and mis-
leading the jury to support its finding.8 9 The Gilliard court, citing
Daubert, stated that it was obligated to review "a district court's deci-
sion to admit or exclude expert testimony under Rule 702... for abuse
of discretion." 90 Under this standard or review, the only grounds to
reverse a district court's decision would be if the court stepped outside
of its boundaries when making its decision. Because of the specifics
outlined in Daubert regarding the "gatekeeping" role of judges, it is
highly unlikely that reversal of such decisions involving polygraph evi-
dence would be commonplace with this standard of appellate review.
In Messina, a Second Circuit case, the district court refused to
allow polygraph evidence presented by the defendant.9 The facts of the
case involved a disbarred lawyer, Messina, who presented the results of
a "passed" polygraph test at his sentencing hearing.92 The polygrapher
was questioned extensively at the sentencing hearing, detailing the meth-
ods used during the examination and possible error rate with regard to
the results.93 In spite of this, the district court stated, "It was interesting
to meet [the polygrapher] and hear his views. I still don't believe-let
me put it this way, I believe that the rule of law which excludes
polygraphs is the right one." 94
Despite the Daubert holding, other courts have used Daubert to
move in a direction of admissibility for polygraphy. In United States v.
Posado, the Fifth Circuit stated that the per se rule against the admissi-
bility of polygraph evidence is no longer viable. 95 The Posado court did
not hold that the polygraph examinations were valid or that they will
always assist the trier of fact. The holding was only that the per se rule
of inadmissibility was removed. 96 The Ninth Circuit has also lifted the
per se rule as well by holding that district courts must use a balancing
test instead of the absolute rule of inadmissibility. 97 Interestingly, the
court held that not only did Daubert overrule the per se rule against
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 812.
91. See United States v. Messina, 131 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 41-42.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 42.
95. 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995).
96. Id.
97. United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997). The court stated: "District courts
must strike the appropriate balance between admitting reliable, helpful expert testimony and
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admission of stipulated evidence, it also removed the per se rule against
non-stipulated evidence.98
H. Enter Scheffer Exit Daubert Stage Left
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided Scheffer.9 9 In
Scheffer, the Court held that the per se rule against the admission of
polygraph evidence in the context of court martial proceedings was still
good law and did not violate the Constitution.100 While the holding in
Scheffer is not binding on state and federal courts due to the Supreme
Court's intentional limiting of the holding to court martial proceed-
ings, 01 it is fairly safe to predict how the Court would rule on a similar
case arising from a state or federal jurisdiction.
The opinion in Scheffer was restricted to the per se application of
Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inad-
missible. 02 The issue in the case involved the admissibility of evidence
from a polygraph examination that indicated that the defendant was tell-
ing the truth about the allegations. Edward Scheffer volunteered as an
informant on drug investigation for the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations. 0 3 He was advised that there would be periodic drug test-
ing and polygraph examinations.10 4 On one occasion, Scheffer provided
a urine sample and then agreed to take a polygraph test. 10 5 The test
indicated no deception when the respondent denied using drugs since
joining the Air Force, but the urinalysis results revealed the presence of
methamphetamine. °6 Scheffer wanted to submit the polygraph evi-
dence in order to support his testimony.' 0 7 The judge denied the motion
on the basis of Military Rule of Evidence 707.108 Scheffer was con-
excluding misleading or confusing testimony to achieve the flexible approach outlined in
Daubert." Id. at 228 (citing United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 1994)).
98. Id. at 228.
99. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
100. Id. at 304.
101. The formation of the issue, according to the Court, evidenced the narrowness of the
decision the Court was making. "This case presents the question whether Military Rule of
Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings,
unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members of the military to present a defense." Id.
at 305.
102. Military Rule of Evidence 707 states, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or
any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be
admitted into evidence."
103. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305.
104. Id.
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victed and sentenced. 10 9
The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed explaining that
Rule 707 "[did] not arbitrarily limit the ability of [the accused] to pre-
sent reliable evidence.""'  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces reversed, holding that a per se exclusion violates an
accused Sixth Amendment right.' The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reversed the appellate court. The Court cited three main legiti-
mate interests that must be met in order to ensure that the trier of fact is
presented with reliable evidence.' 12 The interests developed by the
Court included the reliability interest, the role of the jury, and the possi-
bility of collateral issues that may distract the jury from its central func-
tion of determining guilt or innocence.' '"
With the reliability interest, the Court looked specifically to the
lack of scientific consensus on the issue of polygraph admissibility. The
Court cited the varied holdings from state and federal cases as proof of
the lack of reliability." 4 It was noted that after Daubert, expert testi-
mony (including that of polygraph evidence) could be admitted if the
district court deemed it both relevant and reliable.'"' The Court rea-
soned that Rule 707 was rational and proportional as a means of barring
unreliable evidence." 16 Therefore, according to the Court, the inadmissi-
bility of the evidence in terms of the reliability interest does not offend
the notion of due process.'17
The second interest that the Court mentioned involved the presenta-
tion of the jury's core function of making credibility determinations in
criminal trials.' "8 The Court opined that the use of polygraph evidence
would take away the jury's role in determining whether the accused is
actually being truthful. When presented with evidence from the poly-
graph machine, jurors may give too much credit to the reliability or
109. Id.
110. Id. at 307.
111. Id. ("[A] per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut a attack
on his credibility .. . violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.").
112. Id. at 309.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 311.
115. Id. at 311 n.7.
116. Id. at 312. "Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a
variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a
polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even
the best polygraph exams."
117. Id. at 309.
118. Id. (citing United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)). "A fundamental
premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector."
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infallibility of the device. 1 9 Furthermore, the judge is often unable to
determine whether the expert is likely to unduly influence the jury.
1 20
Based on these factors, the Court determined that the question of usurp-
ing the jury's role was sufficient to survive the issue of admissibility.
Finally, the Court observed that Rule 707 avoided collateral litiga-
tion that could serve to distract the jury.12 ' The Court noted that each
case would involve issues such as the credibility and expertise of the
examiner, the accuracy of the testing instruments, the specific type of
test used and its reliability within the community, and the possibility of
countermeasures used. 22 Because the Court reasoned that this would
have to be done for each and every case, this procedure would be time-
consuming and would take the jury's minds off of the actual matter at
hand-the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Court noted that prior cases addressing this issue were distin-
guishable because in each case the exclusion of evidence that was de-
clared unconstitutional significantly undermined fundamental elements
of the accused's defense. 23 It was explained that the reason the cases
do not invalidate Rule 707 was because the trial court in this case was
allowed to hear all of the relevant details of the case and Rule 707 did
not prevent the defendant from including any factual evidence. 124 Based
on the combination of these reasons, the Court found that Rule 707 did
not violate any rights of the accused and therefore should remain intact.
The problem with the Scheffer ruling is that the Court says that the
accused was allowed to introduce the factual evidence regarding the
case. In actuality, the fact that the accused was not allowed to present
evidence that he did not "intentionally ingest" the methamphetamine
was a significant portion of the case that the trial court refused to allow
119. Id. at 314. "The aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to
abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt."
120. Id.
121. Id. "Rule 707 [avoids] litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Such collateral litigation prolongs criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury form
its central function of determining guilt or innocence."
122. Id.
123. Id. at 315. The precedents that were used by the Court were Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44 (1987), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
('1973). In each of these cases, the Court found that because the accused was denied a
fundamental element of his defense, the exclusion of the evidence was unconstitutional. In Rock,
the Court said that the rule of per se inadmissibility deprived the jury of the testimony of the only
witness who was at the scene with firsthand knowledge of the facts. Rock, 483 U.S. at 57. In
Washington, the Court said that the state arbitrarily denied the accused the right to put a witness
on the stand that was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had
permanently observed. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. In Chambers, the court found that the voucher
rule was a due process violation. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
124. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315.
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the jury to hear. Therefore, there was an impediment for the accused to
defend himself.
The dissent by Justice Stevens agreed and noted that the per se rule
excluding unstipulated polygraph evidence is inconsistent with the flexi-
ble inquiry assigned to the trial judge by Daubert.2 5 Justice Stevens
argued there is no need for the per se exclusion rule anymore because of
the advances that have been achieved in the field and the lack of evi-
dence that juries are unduly swayed by polygraph evidence. 126 As an
interesting point for the admissibility of polygraph evidence, Justice Ste-
vens points to the fact that the lie detector plays a special role in military
practices, even more so than in the civilian world. 2 7 The reason given
for the reliability of military lie detector tests can be attributed to the
stringent standards and extensive training givento the examiners.
28
With regard to the interests articulated by the majority, Justice Ste-
vens notes that even in light of such interests, the Court never acknowl-
edged that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to
present a defense. 129 In terms of the reliability interests, the dissent
points to reports that place the accuracy of polygraph examinations at
eighty-five to ninety percent. 1 31 In terms of the usurpation of the role of
the jury, Justice Stevens says that the function of the jury is to make
credibility determinations and assistance from polygraph examination
evidence could be helpful in making such determinations.' 3 '
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the jury may give undue weight
to the evidence from polygraphy, but reasoned that detailed jury instruc-
tions would serve to minimize the amount of undue weight placed on the
evidence. 3 2 With regard to the collateral litigation argument, Justice
Stevens dismissed this claim by stating, "The potential burden of collat-
125. Id. at 322 n.3.
126. Id. at 322.
127. Id. at 324. "The Military has administered hundreds of thousands of such tests and
routinely uses their results for a wide variety of official decisions."
128. Id. Justice Stevens reports that the Department of Defense has a Polygraph Institute that
bases its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology and applied knowledge that meet the
requirements of master's degree-level of study. The candidates selected must meet certain
criteria, go through rigorous training, and conduct a series of tests under the supervision of a
certified polygraph examiner.
129. Id. at 325-26.
130. Id. at 333.
131. Id. at 336. "In my judgment evidence that tends to establish either a consciousness of
guilt or a consciousness of innocence may be of assistance to the jury in making such
determinations."
132. Id. at 336-37 (citing Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 123, 127-
128, 130 (1980) ("Indeed, research indicates that jurors do not 'blindly' accept polygraph
evidence, but that they instead weigh polygraph evidence with other evidence.").
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eral proceedings to determine the examiner's qualifications is a mani-
festly insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of expert
testimony."'' 33 Put simply, Justice Stevens is of the opinion that
although the concerns regarding the validity of polygraphs are valid,
they are insufficient to support a categorical rule that prohibits the
admission of polygraph evidence in all cases, regardless of the reliability
or probative value of the evidence.
The dissent makes a valid point in stating that there are some
instances when polygraph evidence should not be admitted based on fac-
tors that may limit the reliability of the results, or the undue influence
that my be placed on the jury by the admission. The proper way, how-
ever, to look at these issues should be on a case-by-case basis to the
extent necessary. By applying a per se rule of inadmissibility, the
Supreme Court has basically mandated that regardless of how reliable
the testing is, or how necessary the evidence is to the defense of the
accused, it will not allow polygraph evidence to be admitted. Further,
the Court has chosen to base this broad categorical rule on the premise
that if the facts of the case can be introduced, this will be sufficient to
make the per se rule applicable. The inference then is that it is of no
consequence how effective the alternative presentation of the polygraph
evidence might be. The mere fact that the alternatives exist lends
credence to the idea that the admission of the polygraph evidence is not
necessary.
As far as the jury's role is concerned, this writer would suggest that
the Court rely on its own advice and allow judges to do the job given to
them in Daubert-viz. exercise their gatekeeping roles. What was the
purpose of the Court's decision to give guidelines in Daubert in order to
assist judges in determining the admissibility of evidence with regard to
its probative value, reliability, etc., if, in spite of that guidance, it would
overrule the gatekeeping function of the judges by deciding that poly-
graph evidence is simply inadmissible in all matters? Although Scheffer
concerned a military issue and is only binding on such military courts,
the reasoning the Court espouses for its holding can easily be applied to
civilian cases. This writer predicts that should a case come before the
Court with similar circumstances, where the Court can explain that all of
the facts of the case were introduced, the decision will be the same as in
Scheffer and the polygraph evidence in civilian cases will categorically
be disallowed as well.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Scheffer, through an
implied admission of lack of reliability of polygraph evidence, presented
133. Id. at 337.
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guidelines for creating a foundation for polygraph evidence.' 34 The
court noted that: (1) the examiner must be qualified; (2) the equipment
must work properly and must have been properly used; and (3) the
examiner must have used valid questioning techniques. 35 These guide-
lines were procedural safeguards that were presented as a method of
reducing the inaccuracies of the process of polygraphy. By employing
safeguards, the appellate court attempted to allay the fears regarding the
reliability of the evidence while simultaneously providing a mechanism
for the admissibility of the evidence. These safeguards did not appar-
ently increase the comfort level of the Supreme Court, which ultimately
decided to adhere to the per se inadmissibility rule.
I. Where Do We Go from Here? Post-Scheffer Opinions
A question arises in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Schef-
fer and the presented safeguards of the Court of Appeals of the Armed
Forces, as to what impact Scheffer will have on the attitudes of state and
federal courts. Since Scheffer, there have been a limited number of deci-
sions incorporating Scheffer into their legal analyses. 136 Because of this
limited incorporation, a reasonable answer to that question cannot be
deciphered. There have been several cases published after Scheffer,
however, that have gone in different directions based on the deciding
court's own decision-making factors.
J. Polygraph Evidence Allowed
In Paxton v. Ward,'3 7 the Tenth Circuit found that polygraph evi-
dence was admissible during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. 38
There, the defendant was convicted of murder and petitioned for habeas
corpus. At trial, he was prevented from presenting evidence that he had
passed a polygraph test indicating that he did not kill his wife. 139 The
Tenth Circuit held that the inability of the defendant to present this evi-
dence, specifically in the context of a death penalty case, violated of his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present mitigating
evidence. 1
40
The Ward court decided to allow the polygraph evidence despite
Scheffer. The court stated, "Scheffer is distinguishable in at least one
dispositve respect: it did not involve a capital defendant's constitutional
134. Id. at 323 n.5.
135. Id.
136. See generally Gallai, supra note 67.
137. 99 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999).
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right to present mitigating evidence."'' The court continued its reason-
ing for allowing the polygraph evidence noting, ". . . application of the
per se rule barring polygraph results prevented [the defendant] from tell-
ing the jury the reason why the prior criminal proceedings had been
dismissed, thus significantly impairing his ability to defend against the
death penalty." 4 ' The Ward court distinguished Scheffer by stating,
"Because Scheffer specifically limited its holding to cases in which
exclusion did not undermine the accused's defense or implicate other
significant interests, it is inapposite here." '43
In Davies v. State,'" an Indiana case involving the alleged murder
of a child, the court held that polygraph evidence was admissible, but
failed to include Scheffer in its analysis. 4 5 There, the defendant took a
polygraph examination and later challenged the results of the test.
146
The results of the polygraph examination in Davies showed that the
defendant had been deceptive when he asserted he was not involved in
the crime. The prosecution sought to introduce the evidence in order to
impeach the defendant's credibility.' 47
The Indiana appellate court used the Sanchez test 48 to determine
whether the polygraph examination was admissible based on the stipula-
tion of the parties. 149 In Sanchez, the Indiana Supreme Court put forth
four prerequisites 5° that must be met before polygraph results can be
admitted. 5 ' The Davies court found that because these requirements
141. Id. at 1215.
142. Id. at 1215 n.9.
143. Id. at 1216.
144. 730 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 732.
147. Id.
148. See Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 1996). It is possible that there was no
need to cite to Scheffer because Indiana did not have a per se inadmissibility rule, especially after
Sanchez.
149. Davies, 730 N.E.2d at 737.
150. The four prerequisites of the Sanchez test are:
1) that the prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel all sign a written stipulation
providing for the defendant's submission to the examination and for the subsequent
admission at trial of the results; 2) that notwithstanding the stipulation, the
admissibility of the test results is at the trial court's discretion regarding the
examiner's qualifications and the test conditions; 3) that the opposing party shall
have the right to cross-examine the polygraph examiner if his graphs and opinion
are offered in evidence; and 4) that the jury be instructed that, at most, the
examiner's testimony tends only to show whether the defendant was being truthful
at the time of the examination, and that it is for the jury to determine the weight and
effect to be given such testimony.
Sanchez, 675 N.E.2d at 308.
151. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
had all been met, the polygraph evidence was admissible. 152 The court
also noted in its decision the defendant's insistence on taking the poly-
graph examination. 53 The court concluded that the reasons offered by
the defendant as to why the polygraph evidence was inadmissible were
not sufficient to reverse the verdict, in accordance with the Sanchez
test. 154 Therefore the polygraph results were admissible and the verdict
was sustained.
K. Polygraph Evidence Inadmissible
In State v. Wakefield,155 the Kansas Supreme Court used the Schef-
fer analysis to support its holding of inadmissibility of polygraph evi-
dence. The facts of Wakefield concerned an appeal of a forty year
conviction for various felonious criminal acts, including murder. The
defendant submitted to five different polygraph examinations, all of
which indicated the defendant was being truthful when he asserted that
he had not committed the murders in question.' 56 The Wakefield court
observed, "[In Scheffer] the Supreme Court noted that although the
degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety
of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular
case whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because
certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph
exams."'
157
The Kansas Supreme Court decided against the admissibility of the
polygraph evidence, even though the evidence showed that was being
truthful when he asserted that he was not the murderer. 5' The court
noted in its ruling, "Kansas is among those jurisdictions where doubt
still exists as to the reliability of polygraph examinations ... polygraph
tests are too unreliable to be admissible and they tend to invade the
province of the jury in determining the ultimate question of fact:
whether a witness is speaking the truth." '59
In Willey v. State, 160 the facts concerned a conviction of felony
murder where the Indiana Supreme Court found that the polygraph state-
ments were erroneously admitted. The defendant agreed to the poly-
152. Davies, 730 N.E.2d at 737.
153. Id. at 738.
154. Id. at 737.
155. 977 P.2d 941 (Kan. 1999).
156. Id. at 945.
157. Id. at 955 (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 712 N.E.2d 434 (Ind. 1999).
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graph after being told that he had been implicated in the crime. 16 1 The
defendant failed the polygraph and the results of the examination were
introduced in evidence by the examiner. 62 The court found that the
introduction of this evidence was in error because it failed the Sanchez
test. 163 In spite of this error, the court decided not to reverse the deci-
sion of the lower court. 16 4 The court reasoned that because of other
statements made by the defendant relating to his admitted involvement
in the agreement to harm the deceased, the testimony of the polygrapher,
"at most, had a slight impact on the jury's verdict."'' 65 Therefore, "its
erroneous admission was harmless."'1
66
In an interesting case deciding against the admissibility of poly-
graph evidence, the California Supreme Court stated that polygraph evi-
dence is still not reliable enough to warrant admissibility in court unless
the parties stipulate to its admissibility or the defendant offers proof that
the techniques used in the polygraph are generally accepted by the scien-
tific community.' 67 The defendant was convicted of murder following a
jury trial. In an unusual circumstance, the defendant asked the court to
compel one of the prosecution's key witnesses to submit to a polygraph
examination. 168 The defendant believed that because of the witness's
purported lack of credibility, the polygraph would serve as an additional
consideration for the prosecution in deciding whether to proceed with
the special circumstances against the defendant. 69 In response to the
request, the California Supreme Court stated, "The trial court ruled...
that 'there is not either authority [,] nor acceptance in the scientific com-
munity, with reference to the polygraph, [and] for those reasons, the
motion will be denied.' We agree that defendant was not entitled to
have the court compel a polygraph examination of [the witness]."' 7°
The court denied the request to have the witness take a polygraph
examination in spite of the inconsistencies in the reports given to the
police and the testimony of the witness. The court reasoned that the
defense could attempt to attack the witness's credibility using the
already available means of attack under the California Evidence
Code.' 7 ' The court, however, noted, "It is implicit in Evidence Code
161. Id. at 438.
162. Id. at 438-39.
163. Id. at 440-41.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 442.
167. See People v. Ayala, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 706 (Cal. 2000).
168. Id. at 705-06.
169. Id. at 706.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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section 351.1 that at trial court may not compel a polygraph examina-
tion. It would be an idle act, which 'the law neither does nor
requires.' "172
Other courts have also used the Scheffer holding to support the
denial of polygraph evidence. In People v. Jefferson,173 the Illinois
Supreme Court decided that the admission of polygraph evidence was
not ordinarily allowed, its admittance in this case was harmless error
because of the jury instructions and the court's belief in the jurors. 174 In
Jefferson, the defendant agreed to take a polygraph test, but gave an
inculpatory statement to the police before test was administered. The
defendant sought to have the fact that she had agreed to take a polygraph
examination excluded based on the precedents regarding the inadmissi-
bility of polygraph evidence. The court explained the reason for its
decision:
We do not depart from our longstanding rule that evidence about pol-
ygraph testing is generally inadmissible in courts in Illinois. Such
evidence became relevant and admissible here, however, when the
defendant offered an alternative explanation for the reasons that led
her to confess to the charged offenses. We believe that the State was
entitled to rebut the defendant's explanation with other evidence
about her reasons for speaking to authorities.'
7 5
The court "cured" this problem by giving instructions to the jury to use
the reference to the polygraph only to determine whether the defendant's
statement was unreliable.
A Virginia appellate court ruled in the same manner, stating that
although polygraph evidence is improper, its admission was not grounds
for a mistrial because the court believed that there was no prejudice as a
result of the evidence.' 76 The defense contended that the mere mention
of the polygraph unfairly prejudiced the jury. The judge gave instruc-
172. California Evidence Code § 351.1 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a
polygraph examination shall not be admissible in any criminal proceeding . . .
unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results.
(b) Nothing in this section is intended to preclude from evidence statements made
during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 351.1.
173. 705 N.E.2d 56 (11. 1998).
174. The Jefferson court stated: "[T]he general rule in Illinois is to preclude introduction of
evidence regarding polygraph examinations and the results of those tests .... [P]olygraphy is not
sufficiently reliable to establish guilt or innocence.... the quasi-scientific nature of the test may
lead a trier of fact to give the evidence undue weight, notwithstanding its lack of reliability ..
Id. at 59-60 (citations and quotations omitted).
175. Id. at 62.
176. See generally Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 443 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)
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tions to the jury to disregard the testimony regarding the polygraph. The
defense, however, continued to argue that this measure did not suffi-
ciently mitigate the harm. The appellate court ruled that a mistrial was
not warranted because although the exam was mentioned, there was no
information given as to any specifics regarding the outcome of the
examination, or the willingness of the defendant to take the examination.
In a recent Pennsylvania case, a court held that there was a revers-
ible error because a polygraph test was referred to directly without cau-
tionary instructions. 177 In Commonwealth v. Watkins, the defendant was
convicted and appealed based on the premise that the reference of the
failed polygraph test was prejudicial.' 78 The Watkins court distin-
guished its case from the cited cases by noting that there were no cau-
tionary instructions given to the jury to prevent a prejudicial effect.
179
In its opinion, the court cited cases that involved a reference to
polygraphs where cautionary jury instructions were given with regard to
the examinations.
80
The Watkins court held that although the prosecution never men-
tioned the results of the polygraph examination, the references to the
polygraph allowed for jury inference.' 8 ' This inference was sufficient to
warrant a new trial because the implication of the polygraph bolstered
the validity of other evidence for the jury.18 2 From the court's statement
regarding cautionary instructions, it can be inferred that if there had been
cautionary instructions to the jury explaining to what extent the informa-
tion regarding the polygraph evidence should have been used, the refer-
ence to the polygraph might have been admissible.
As noted, the courts are varied with regard to whether to admit
polygraph evidence and what circumstances, if any, dictate the admissi-
bility of such questionable evidence. It does appear that defendants are
not allowed to submit their evidence when the evidence is in their favor.
Similarly, it appears that when the evidence is against the defendant, the
evidence is allowed to come in, or allowed to remain in evidence
because of a "harmless error" label. In spite of the varied opinions
regarding the admissibility, this writer believes that polygraphy will
slowly begin to be admitted into evidence in more and more courtrooms
("Although we find Mrs. Bennett's reference to her polygraph was improper, we disagree
appellant's defense was prejudiced as a result.").
177. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 750 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 317-18. (citing Commonwealth v. Sneeringer, 668 A.2d 1167, 1174 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995); Commonwealth v. Rhone, 619 A.2d 1080 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Upchurch, 513 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
181. Id. at 319.
182. Id.
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throughout the country where the evidence is against the interest of the
criminal defendant.
The reasons for this belief have been hinted at in previous deci-
sions. First, the technology involved and the advancements of the sci-
ence of polygraphy are continuously being improved. It is the opinion
of some that these improvements will soon remove the reliability aspect
of polygraphy. 83 Secondly, the reports that indicate juries are being
affected more by the instructions of the court, rather than the results of a
polygraph test, will probably begin to be cited to more by the prosecu-
tion or courts seeking to uphold the admission of favorable polygraph
evidence for the prosecution in an effort to avoid the undue weight argu-
ment. Lastly, in light of the safeguards that can be employed to mini-
mize the level of inaccuracy, more polygraph evidence will be allowed
into evidence and the jury will be allowed to do its job-decide on the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
In spite of all of the advances in the field of polygraphy, judging
from the cases reviewed, the significance of these advances will only be
viewed in a positive light when the prosecution seeks to introduce the
evidence, or when the defendant is harmed by the evidence. This may
all be circumstantial, but it appears that often when the defendant
attempts to prove his innocence through a "passed" polygraph test, those
very same instruments which appear to be improving their reliability
(when introduced by the prosecution) are not worthy of admissibility
and are too unreliable to be considered as an assistance to the finders of
fact.
III. REPRESSED MEMORIES-MEMORY OR MAKE BELIEVE?
As stated earlier, the issue of repressed memory evidence is a
related issue to polygraph evidence. This is evidence that has been "put
away" or repressed and then remembered at a later period of time. 84
183. See James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph Evidence, or "Even
If the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the Results? " 49 HASTINGs L.J. 925 (April
1998). McCall states:
All that is necessary for the past irrational judicial attitude toward polygraph
evidence to change is for courts to seriously confront the claim by its proponents
that polygraph testing procedures scientific knowledge .... If courts approach the
issue of polygraph evidence by requiring proof of the scientific methodology. ...
the history of the achievements of American science gives reason to believe that the
seemingly significant problems concerning polygraph theory and practice will either
be solved or proven to have been non-existent.
Id. at 943-44.
184. See Cynthia V. McAlister, Comment, The Repressed Memory Phenomenon: Are
Recovered Memories Significantly Valid Evidence Under Daubert?, 22 N.C. CENT. L. J. 56, 59
(1996).
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Usually, repressed memories concern incidents of sexual abuse or mis-
conduct.' 85 This factor adds to the sensitivity of the issue, but there are
still concerns about the admissibility of the repressed memory testi-
mony. The issues concerning the admissibility of this evidence mirror
the issues of polygraphy. These include whether the evidence reliable,
whether the evidence generally accepted, and whether expert testimony
on the issue actually assist the fact finder. One of the major develop-
ments on repressed memory theory is that some courts have generally
allowed the evidence if: (1) the evidence was remembered without the
aid of psychotherapy; and (2) if the testimony can be corroborated by
other evidence.' 86 Consequently, if an alleged victim remembered the
incidents through psychotherapy and there is no evidence to corroborate
the testimony, some courts have ruled that the evidence is inadmissi-
ble187 unless it meets the requirements of the Frye test.' 88 This has been
the source of debate in jurisdictions throughout the country.
The distinctions in judgments regarding repressed memory testi-
mony are not as detectable as those involving polygraph testimony. In
other words, it does not appear that the party introducing the evidence,
or the party to whom the evidence is adverse, is a determinative factor in
the decisions by the courts. Instead, the decisions have no real pattern
and are seemingly subject solely to what the court wants the outcome to
be. This may be because of the idea that a repressed memory is new and
the existence of such memories is extremely difficult to laymen, let
alone judges. In spite of this, courts have used the guideline given to
them by the Supreme Court in an effort to work through this muddled
situation.
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided in Rock v. Arkansas that the
per se inadmissibility rule regarding hypnotically refreshed memory
(memory recovered through psychotherapy) when offered by a defen-
dant was no longer good law. '8 9 The Court made this decision since the
testimony could be corroborated by other evidence and that the only
witness available was the accused, who had undergone psychother-
185. Id.
186. See generally Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); New York
v. Murphy, 235 A.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
187. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18 (Cal. 1982); In re Marriage of Broderick, 209
Cal. App. 3d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
188. The Kelly-Frye test has been adopted from People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976)
and Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Kelly, the California Supreme Court
held that testimony based on "a new scientific technique" requires proof that it is reliable. To
satisfy this requirement, the proponent of the testimony must show that the technique has gained
general acceptance, that the witness is testifying as a qualified expert on the subject and that the
correct scientific procedures were used in the case.
189. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
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apy. 90 Consequently, the per se rule would in actuality prevent the wit-
ness from testifying on her own behalf, which the Court reasoned was a
violation of the Sixth Amendment. ''
After the Rock decision, there were many questions left open that
have aided in the lack of uniformity in decisions in the varied jurisdic-
tions. This portion of the Comment discusses repressed memory theory
and how it is believed to work. The Comment will then discuss what the
issues are concerning the reliability of repressed memory theory and
how courts have dealt with the issues, including the question of the stat-
ute of limitations. Finally, the Comment will conclude with the writer's
hypothesis as to the trend and final outcome of this controversial
evidence.
A. The Theory of Repressed Memory
"[S]tudies have shown that individuals who have suffered a painful
or traumatic experience sometimes repress their memories of the
event." 92 The term repression refers to the mind's "putting away" or
concealing of the traumatic event from itself within the "unconscious".
The repressed material does not cease to exist; it is merely stored in a
place in the mind that is not easily or readily accessible.1 93 Sometimes
the repressed memory can be "triggered" by an event and recalled from
the "unconscious."' 94 Other times, the individual undergoing some sort
of psychotherapy recalls the event.' 95
Currently, the ability of one to recover the memories without aid
lends to more acceptance than memories that are recovered with the use
of therapy.' 96 This is because therapists often recommend asking
patients if they recall any sexual abuse or if they believe they have been
sexually abused. 197 Some therapists also go through a sort of "roll call"
where they call out various symptoms that are often exhibited by people
who have been sexually abused. 98 The problem raised by these tech-
niques is that the thought of sexual abuse can be planted in the minds of
the patient by the mere suggestion of its occurrence, or the identification
of one of the "symptoms."'' 99
190. Id.
191. Id. at 62.
192. Wilson v. Phillips, 73 Cal. App. 4th 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
193. Victor Barall, Book Review: Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology
of Memory, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1476 (1994).
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There are two distinct schools of thought with regard to whether the
advent of psychotherapy actually results in accurate memory recollec-
tion.2" Those who believe that memories are easily implanted or sug-
gested also submit that because such possibilities exist, the method of
recovery is flawed because one cannot distinguish between events that
have been suggested and events that actually happened. 0 ' In fact, one
psychiatrist has described the repressed memory syndrome as "a way of
absolving yourself for screwing up by shifting the blame to your infancy
when you can't be blamed for anything. From these gymnastics, by
which 'therapists' make their money, the adult emerges guilt-free. 20 2
There are also some who have reported that there is no evidence that
supports the repressed memory theory at all. 03 The other school of
thought looks to the various studies that show that repressed memory
through psychotherapy does result in accurate memory recovery.2
°4
Because there is some question as to whether traditional memory pro-
cess is affected by events, memory that is assisted in recovery surely
will raise the same concerns.
B. Traditional and Hypnotically Refreshed Memory:
Problems and Possibilities
There are three stages of the traditional memory process: percep-
tion, retention, and retrieval.20 ' Research has shown that events in one's
life can affect all three stages to the point where memories are altered.20 6
Because memories may be altered by other events and then recalled
inaccurately this raises some significant questions as to whether recalled
memory testimony should be admitted into evidence, whether hypnoti-
cally assisted or not. This road of thought is extremely dangerous
because if we begin to question the process of traditional memory and its
200. See Sheila Taub, The Legal Treatment of Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 17
J. LEGAL MED. 183 (1996).
201. Id. at 190.
202. See Lynn Holdsworth, Is it Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or is it False Memory
Syndrome? The Controversy and its Potential Legal Implications, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103,
107 (1998) (citing Ralph Slovenko, The "Revival of Memory" of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Is the
Tolling of the Statute of Limitations Justified?, 21 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 7, 20 (1993)).
203. See DAVID S. HOLMES, THE EVIDENCE FOR REPRESSION: AN EXAMINATION OF SIXTY
YEARS OF RESEARCH, in REPRESSION & DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY, THEORY,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND HEALTH 85 (Jerome Singer ed. 1990).
204. See Judith L. Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of Memories of
Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1, 1-14 (1987).
205. Garry M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 133 (1993).
206. See Emily E. Smith-Lee, Recovered Memories of Childhood Abuse: Should Longe-Buried
Memories Be Admissible Testimony?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 591, 604 (1996).
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reliability, the reliability of any witness in court proceedings will always
be under scrutiny regarding the accuracy of what he or she remembers.
According to scientists in the field, there is no identifiable timeframe
that explains when memory begins to become susceptible to outside
events. Because of this dangerous idea, most courts have rarely com-
mented on the accuracy of traditional memory and have continued to
concentrate on memory that was aided by some sort of
psychotherapy.2 °7
One substantial question that arises is how accurately one can dis-
tinguish between normal (non-repressed memories) and recovered mem-
ories. The opponents of refreshed memory testimony base many of their
arguments on the fact that "It]here is no empirical evidence to support
the assertion that experts can identify accurate recall."208 Therefore,
even the most skilled psychotherapist may not be able to detect a mem-
ory that is accurate from one that is not.20 9 Further, in terms of the
admissibility of such memory recall, it is important that the purpose of
the therapy is kept in mind.21° The therapist does not depend on the
accuracy of the memories, but uses the memories as a therapeutic tool in
order to "ease the patient's symptoms, regardless of the accuracy of the
memories. 12 t Therefore, it is argued that allowing this testimony to be
admitted undermines the jury's role as fact-finder because admitting this
evidence will be seen as bolstering of the credibility of the witness.
212
The concerns involving repressed memory understandably become
even more significant vis-a-vis the reliability of memories that have
been recalled through some sort of psychotherapy technique. The argu-
ment against the reliability of this type of therapy concerns the idea that
when someone goes to therapy, he is generally seeking an answer.2 13
This makes the person vulnerable and susceptible to the suggestions of
his therapist. 214 In commenting on the suggestive nature of a repressed
memory therapy session, one author states:
There is no reason to believe that repressed memories are any less
susceptible to the processes of decay and falsification than "normal"
memories. Indeed, it is arguable that persons who have no present
recollection of alleged events in the remote past may be particularly
207. See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra, note 205.
208. Joseph A. Spadaro, Note, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of Repressed
and Recovered Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 30 CONN. L.
REV. 1147, 1192 (1998).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1193.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See McAlister, supra note 184.
214. Id. at 62.
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vulnerable to suggestion by others, such as psychotherapists, or
trusted friends, that such events actually occurred, and my come to
"remember them" accordingly.215
The American Psychological Association disagrees with the skep-
tics of repressed memory. While the Association admits that sugges-
tions can be implanted into the mind of a patient and most patients come
to therapy after an event has been triggered, rather than going to therapy
to trigger the event.2" 6 Further, it argues there is no significant evidence
that supports the unreliability of hypnotically refreshed memories in
comparison to "traditional" memory reliability. Therefore, the science is
helpful in assisting victims in working through their problems and,
accordingly, the results of such therapy can be used in a court of law in
the same manner as other recalled testimony." 7 The Association
strongly argues in support of the actual existence of repressed memories
and their accessibility, even years, after an incident. First, the theory of
repressed memory has been in the field since the days of Freud.218 The
general theory of Freud on this issue was that people repress memories
as a form of a defense mechanism. 219 Secondly, there is a similar exam-
ple of repressed memory seen through Vietnam veterans. 220 These indi-
viduals often suffer from Post Traumatic Stress disorder where the
mental trauma does not surface until fifteen or twenty years after the
event actually occurred.221 Another point that scientists rely on with
regard to the validity of repressed memory theory is the fact that people
remember events on their own by "triggers" or things that occur in their
lives. Proponents argue that because these events are remembered with-
out any aid this attests to the fact that repressed memories do exist and
can be recovered.
The opposition's argument is equally as compelling. They argue
that if repressed memories do exist and can be recovered, there is no
verifiable method of determining the accuracy of such memories. 222 It is
also argued that repressed memories will be more susceptible to altera-
tion because they are often repressed for several years and, thus, are
215. Susan Chira, Sexual Abuse: The Coil of Truth and Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at
D3 (explaining how it would be easy for a therapist to suggest things to a patient that never
existed and have the patient remember the events as though they did; implication is that the more
problems a therapist would be able to uncover, the more sessions will be needed, the more money
earned).
216. See Taub, supra note 200.
217. Id.
218. See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 205.
219. Id. at 134.
220. See id. at 133.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 157.
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exposed to more of the experiences and outside influences on the indi-
vidual.223 Critics also argue against the techniques used by the ther-
apists in memory recovery, stating that the techniques alone may unduly
influence the minds of the person seeking assistance. 2 4
It is clear that the scientific community is at odds regarding the
reliability of repressed memory evidence. Therefore, it is easy to under-
stand why the legal community relying on the opinions of the scientific
community has not come to a consensus regarding the admissibility of
repressed memory evidence. Courts have attempted to deal with the
problem by employing the requirements of safeguards and corrobora-
tion, but questions of reliability of the scientific theory behind repressed
memory evidence still remain.
C. Repressed Memory Court Decisions
Because of the controversy surrounding repressed testimony, in
1987, the Supreme Court was forced to deal with the issue in Rock v.
Arkansas."' The case involved the admissibility of the source of the
controversy in this issue-hypnotically refreshed testimony. The case
did not concern the common repressed memory sexual abuse claim, but
involved a question of intent in a homicide case. The Court, through a
narrow holding, in a five to four decision, allowed the testimony in spite
of the use of psychotherapy.
The facts of the case involved a woman who was charged with
manslaughter for the killing of her husband. 26 Her accounts to the
police, according to their reports, as to what happened during the inci-
dent were not exactly the same.22 7 Because she was having a difficult
time remembering specific facts regarding the incident, she was advised
by her attorney to undergo psychotherapy in order to refresh her mem-
ory. When the prosecutor learned of the psychotherapy, he filed a
motion to exclude the testimony of the defendant.2 28 The trial judge
agreed. The court ordered that the defendant's testimony would be lim-
ited only to what was remembered before the therapy sessions. The
defendant was convicted, and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
rejected her claim that the limit on her testimony violated the Sixth
Amendment. 9 The defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of
certiorari. The Supreme Court invalidated the per se exclusionary rule
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
226. Id. at 45.
227. Id. at 46.
228. Id. at 47.
229. Id.
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of Arkansas.23 °
In its holding, which appeared limited only to certain circum-
stances, 231 the Court noted that the rule of per se inadmissibility of all
hypnotically refreshed testimony infringed impermissibly on the crimi-
nal defendant's right to testify on her own behalf.232 The Court made it
clear that because the defendant was precluded from giving complete
testimony, coupled with the fact that there was corroboration for the
events, including expert testimony, the application of the per se rule in
this case was impermissible. In addition, the court noted that in order to
ensure the effectiveness of our adversary system, the testimony of those
of competent understanding about the facts must be allowed to testify.233
It was the opinion of the Supreme Court that Arkansas applied an
arbitrary rule of exclusion on the grounds that hypnotically refreshed
memory testimony is always unreliable.234 The problem with this, as the
Court described, was that the rule left no discretion to the trial judge to
admit the testimony even if the judge is persuaded that the testimony is
reliable.2 35 Another problem the Court had with the application of the
rule was the fact that it prohibited the testimony of anyone who had
undergone hypnosis, regardless of what other evidence may have been
available to corroborate the information or the reason for the
hypnosis.2 36
The Court emphasized, however, that there are legitimate limita-
tions to the right to present relevant testimony. "The right 'may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
230. Id. at 62.
231. Id. at 57. The Court noted:
In this case, the application of that rule had a significant adverse effect on
petitioner's ability to testify. It virtually prevented her from describing any of the
events that occurred on the day of the shooting, despite the corroboration of many of
those events by other witnesses. Even more importantly, under the court's rule
petitioner was not permitted to describe the actual shooting except in the words
contained in Doctor Back's notes. The expert's description of the gun's tendency to
misfire would have taken on greater significance if the jury had heard the petitioner
testify that she did not have her finger on the trigger and that the gun went off when
her husband hit her arm.
Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 54. "[Tjhe conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be
determined by the jury or by the court." Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22
(1967)).
234. Id. at 61.
235. Id. at 56 n.12.
236. Id. at 56. "This rule operates to the detriment of any defendant who undergoes hypnosis,
without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances under which it took place, or any
independent verification of the information it produced."
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criminal trial process.' ",237 The Court noted that states must use a sort of
balancing test between the defendant's constitutional right to testify and
an analysis of whether the interests served by such an exclusionary rule
justify the limitation. 238 The Court ruled that in light of the gravity of
the rights at stake, the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to perform the
necessary constitutional analysis before rendering a decision. 239 From
dictum, the Court appears to open the door for states to exclude evidence
if they conduct this constitutional balancing test and determine if gov-
ernmental interests outweigh the defendant's constitutional rights. This
may present some difficulty for the state (although the Court gave no
examples of the pattern such a conclusion would follow), but it does
provide states with another avenue for exclusion.
The Arkansas Supreme Court decided to exclude the testimony in
part because the testimony had not been proven to be reliable. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the fact that the opinions
regarding the technique vary, but noted the use of safeguards can mini-
mize the inaccuracies in the process, making the evidence more relia-
ble.24 ° By explaining the types of safeguards that could be used in the
decision to admit repressed memory evidence, the Court appears to pro-
vide another permissible avenue of exclusion. Although the list is not to
be considered as all-inclusive, it could be argued that if several of the
listed safeguards are not met, a state court could conclude that the relia-
bility of the evidence was not enough to warrant its admittance. This
could serves as evidence of performing the constitutional balancing test
that the Court indicated was necessary to determine whether the evi-
dence is admissible.
Aside from safeguards related to the actual science, the Court
emphasized the traditional safeguards, such as corroboration of the testi-
mony, effective cross-examination, and jury education and instructions
237. Id. at 55 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
238. Id. at 56.
239. Id. at 57-58.
240. The Court noted:
One set of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to be performed only by a
psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is independent
of the investigation. These procedures reduce the possibility that biases will be
communicated to the hypersuggestive subject by the hypnotist. Suggestion will be
less likely also if the hypnosis is conducted in a neutral setting with no one present
by the hypnotist and the subject. Tape or video recording of all interrogations,
before, during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal if leading questions were asked.
Such guidelines do not guarantee the accuracy of the testimony, because they cannot
control the subject's own motivations or any tendency to confabulate, but they do
provide a means of controlling overt suggestions.
Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted).
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that can be useful in determining the accuracy of the testimony.24'
Again, the Court appears to open another method that may be used for
exclusion-corroboration. Throughout the opinion, the Court addresses
the fact that there is corroboration for the evidence from the hypnotically
refreshed testimony. Arguably, without corroboration, in spite of other
safeguards that may have been employed, safeguards alone could be
insufficient to avoid the inadmissibility of the evidence.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court effectively was that because
of the corroboration of the evidence and the tape recordings of the hyp-
nosis (a mentioned safeguard), the trial court should have considered
admissibility of the evidence. Because the per se rule prohibited this
consideration, the rule impermissibly infringes on the right of a defen-
dant to testify on his own behalf.24 2 Again, at the conclusion of the
opinion, the Court gave another subtle hint that exclusion of hypnoti-
cally refreshed evidence will not always be impermissible by stating,
"[the] circumstances present an argument for admissibility of peti-
tioner's testimony in this particular case, an argument that must be con-
sidered by the trial court. 243 It can be argued that Rock should be
considered with regard to the facts of the circumstances in this case and
the trial court must only consider the circumstances in their decision to
admit the evidence.
The Court never addressed the admissibility of repressed memory
evidence without the use of hypnosis or the level of corroboration
needed in order to constitute verification of the refreshed testimony.
Also, because the Court was not presented with the questions of whether
testimony of another witness with repressed memory evidence would be
admissible, whether a sexual abuse case would have received the same
analysis, or the statute of limitation issue with regard to repressed mem-
ories these questions were also left open. Therefore, it has been left to
individual courts to determine whether they will allow the evidence to
be entered in circumstances that do not fall in the narrow circumstances
of Rock.
There was a stinging dissent in Rock that emphasizes the shortcom-
ings of the majority's opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
majority ignores the fact that the "[t]he Constitution does not in any way
relieve the defendant from compliance with 'rules of procedure and evi-
dence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertain-
241. Id. at 61. "Certain information recalled as a result of hypnosis may be verified as highly
accurate by corroborating evidence. Cross-examination, even in the face of a confident defendant,
is an effective tool for revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can be educated to the risks of
hypnosis through expert testimony and other cautionary instruction."
242. Id.
243. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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ment of guilt and innocence.' "244 Chief Justice Rehnquist continues,
"Surely a rule designed to exclude testimony whose trustworthiness is
inherently suspect cannot be said to fall outside this description." '245 In
other words, the dissent seems to argue that although the defendant has a
constitutional right to testify on her own behalf, that testimony must still
be governed by the rules designed to created uniformity within the jus-
tice system. Because the testimony of the defendant is untrustworthy
and reliable, the rules mandate that the testimony be excluded. The dis-
sent does not argue that the evidence from hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony will forever be disallowed, but the lack of consensus regarding the
use of hypnosis lends to the idea that such evidence at this point should
not be admissible.246 In addition, the dissent expresses an administrative
concern247 over the mandate that each trial judge be made to consider
the matter of admissibility of evidence in each case. 4 8
The five-to-four decision in Rock tends to support the idea that the
decision could have easily gone in the other direction. The Court was
greatly divided on this issue and so are other courts that have tackled the
question of admissibility. As with most controversial issues, the deci-
sions of the courts are as greatly varied as are the reasons given for the
decisions. Without any uniform rules, it is no wonder why courts con-
tinue to struggle to make sense out of an issue that the psychological
community and the Supreme Court cannot agree upon.
D. To Be or Not To Be
After Rock, the question becomes: what are the courts supposed to
do? The Rock decision made the per se inadmissibility rule unconstitu-
tional, but so what? The Court provided little guidelines for federal and
state courts to follow. Consequently, there are a substantial amount of
cases being litigated with a variety of different results. In an effort to
fairly decide cases of repressed memory evidence, courts have devel-





248. Id. This writer agrees that refreshed memory testimony should not be allowed, but the
reason of administrative concern does not appear to support the idea. The trial judge's job,
according to the Supreme Court in Daubert, is to do the very thing the dissent expresses will cause
a problem. The role of the trial judge is to serve a "gatekeeping" function and to evaluate the
evidence and its admissibility based on the factors presented to the court. Thus, it is rather
ridiculous for the Court to question that the very job of the trial judge (which in the majority's
opinion was simply made clearer) should not be something other than "gatekeeping" because of
the potential "administrative difficulties."
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oped their own procedures for admissibility, while attempting to follow
the Rock holding.
E. Repressed Memory Testimony Allowed
In State v. Murphy,249 a New York appellate court allowed
repressed memory testimony due to the presence of other evidence to
corroborate it. Murphy involved a defendant who was accused of mur-
der, attempted murder, and petit larceny. 25 ° Neither of the victims could
identify the defendant. After a year, one of the victims recalled the
attack and was able to identify the defendant. The defendant appealed
his convictions on the grounds that the testimony of the witness should
have been inadmissible because it was based on repressed memory. 5
The appellate court allowed the testimony of the witness based on
its understanding of the triggering mechanism that can occur with
repressed memories.252 The court was also careful to note, however,
that had the repressed memory been triggered by hypnosis, the analysis
would have been different:
On the critical question of whether such previously repressed memo-
ries are authentic, there are no empirical answers, although those
recovered in therapeutic settings should be viewed with skepticism
given the oftentimes suggestive therapeutic environment. That
impediment is not present here; nevertheless, we believe that this
type of testimony should not be admissible unless it is independently
corroborated.253
In another case, Wilson v. Phillips,254 the California Court of
Appeal allowed the repressed memory testimony, stating that because it
was not hypnotically refreshed, and that it was corroborated by expert
testimony, that the psychological symptoms were consistent with per-
sons who had been sexually abused.25 The facts of the case concerned
stepsisters who had allegedly been abused as children.256 One of the
sisters began remembering the incidents and eventually shared them
with her stepsister. The latter then began to remember the incidents, and
both decided to sue Phillips.5 7 The court decided to admit the evidence
249. 235 A.D.2d 933 (N.Y. App. 1997).
250. Id. at 933.
251. Id. at 934.
252. Id. "[A] repressed memory may spontaneously resurface as the result of a variety of
triggering mechanisms that usually are related to the traumatic event." Id. (quoting Emsdorff &
Loftus, supra note 205, at 132).
253. Id. (citations omitted).
254. 73 Cal. App. 4th 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 252.
257. Id.
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based on the absence of hypnotic therapy and the corroboration.258
Phillips, the defendant, argued that there should be a Kelly-Frye
hearing25 9 to determine the general acceptance of repressed memory the-
ory in the scientific community. 26" The court rejected the argument.
"Kelly-Frye applies to cases involving novel devices or processes, not to
expert medical testimony . . .,,26 The court accepted the testimony
based upon the fact that it did not concern the validity of repressed
memory theory, and accordingly, it did not require a Kelly-Frye
hearing.262
The Wilson court distinguished between expert medical testimony,
as the type rendered in the case, and evidence derived form a new scien-
tific device or procedure, such as repressed memory theory:
When a witness gives his [or her] personal opinion on the stand -
even if he [or she] qualifies as an expert - the jurors may temper
their acceptance of his [or her] testimony with a healthy skepticism
born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible. But the
opposite may be true when the evidence is produced by a machine:
like many laypersons, jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high
degree of certainty to proof derived from an apparently 'scientific'
mechanism, instrument, or procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility
that often surrounds such evidence may well conceal the fact that it
remains experimental and tentative.
263
Wilson differs from Murphy because the Murphy court required that
testimony be "independently corroborated." In Wilson, the testimony
that corroborated the evidence stemmed from a therapy session that was
related to the accusation. The court ruled that it would allow the testi-
mony because the expert did not testify as to the validity of the claim of
the sexual abuse. 264 The expert only testified that in her opinion, the
profiles of the alleged victims were consistent with those of sexual abuse
cases.
265
F. Inadmissibility of Repressed Memory Evidence
In State v. Hungerford,266 the New Hampshire Supreme Court fol-
lowed the holding in Rock and denied the admission of repressed mem-
258. Id.
259. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
260. Wilson, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 253.
261. Id. at 254 (quoting People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
262. Id. at 256.
263. Id. at 254-55 (quoting People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), overruled
in part by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000)).
264. Id. at 255.
265. Id. at 253.
266. 697 A.2d 916, 930 (N.H. 1997).
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ory testimony.2 67 Although the Hungerford court disallowed the
repressed memory evidence, it did so after an examination of the science
of repressed memory and not on the basis of a per se inadmissibility
rule. 268 Thus, the Hungerford court followed the directions handed
down by the United States Supreme Court. After an in-depth analysis of
repressed memory evidence, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated,
"Our review of the memories without regard to the suggestiveness of the
therapeutic process, however, convinces us that they do not pass our test
of reliability." '69 The court continued, "There probably will be a day, as
there has been regarding the forensic use of DNA, when courts can be
given reliable, competent information on the issue of repressed memory.
That day is not here. '"270
In Schall v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company,27' the Califor-
nia appellate court refused to allow repressed memory testimony. The
Schall court also walked through the door of inadmissibility that the
Supreme Court decision in Rock left wide open. The Schall court ana-
lyzed the admissibility of the repressed memory evidence and con-
cluded, "The vice of hypnosis, in the legal sense, is the unreliability of
the facts restored by the process, not of a specific goal to recover facts in
aid of litigation. 272 The court also decided to deny the admittance of
other testimony that the witness claimed was shared with her therapist
before the hypnotic sessions.2 73 The court stated that it was unable to
discern what events were recalled and relayed to the therapist before the
hypnosis, the entire testimony relating to the events discussed in hypno-
sis was inadmissible.
2 74
In Franklin v. Stevenson,275 the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of a lower court and held that repressed memory evidence
should not have been admitted.2 76 The case involved a plaintiff that
used therapy to discover that her cousin physically abused her.2 77 The
Utah Supreme Court decided that the plaintiff failed to prove that her




270. Id. (quoting Ault v. Jasko, 673 N.E.2d 870, 875-76 (Ohio 1994) (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting)).
271. 37 Cal. App. 4th 1485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
272. Id. at 1493.
273. Id.
274. Id. "[PIlaintiff claims that some proposed testimony was about events recalled and
related to her therapist prior to the hypnotic sessions. As we have noted, however, the evidence
showing this fact is, at best, conflicting."
275. See Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999).
276. Id. at 30.
277. Id. at 23.
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reliable.2 78
There are other courts that have distinguished their particular cases
from the narrow Rock holding. This was not a difficult task, considering
that the Rock holding specified that the inadmissibility as applied in the
case was unconstitutional because the rule "had a significant adverse
effect on the petitioner's ability to testify. '2 79  Based on this holding,
several courts have refused to admit refreshed memory testimony on the
grounds that the defendant was allowed to testify.28 ° As a result, no
difficulties with the Rock decision were implicated.
In Burral v. State, the court followed the implications of the Rock
holding.2 8 ' The Supreme Court in Rock made a point of noting that it
did not decide whether the per se admissibility rule applied to anyone
other than the defendant. In Burral, the court noted, "There is no doubt
but that Rock itself was carefully confined to the testimony of the defen-
dant."28 The Burral court concluded that the defendant's right to com-
pulsory process did not entitle him to present hypnotically-enhanced
testimony of a defense witness.2 83
G. Matter of Time
There is another substantial issue regarding repressed memory evi-
dence-the issue of time. In other words, at what point will the courts
decide that even with repressed memory the ability to pursue legal
action against an alleged perpetrator no longer exists? The question
focuses on how much time the courts will allow to pass before a propo-
nent faces a "you snooze, you lose" summary judgment or directed
278. Id. at 30.
279. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57 (1987).
280. See, e.g., Morgan v. Krenke, 232 F.3d 562, 569-70 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the "trial
judge did not prevent [the defendant] from testifying"); United States. v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 944
(7th Cir. 1998) (this case is different from Rock because defendant was allowed to testify; far from
being "virtually prevented form describing any of the events" relevant to his defense, defendant
answered a "plethora of questions", in which he was able to refute all of the elements of this
charge); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the defendant was
allowed to testify and the fact that he chose not to do so in accordance with the regulations of
testimony did not create a Rock problem.); Cox v. Wyrick, 873 F.2d 200, 202 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that because the defendant was not prevented from presenting testimony, his reliance on
Rock for a reversal was misplaced; defendant chose not to testify and he was not prevented from
doing so); Rault v. Butler, 826 F.2d 299, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987) (There are three distinguishing
factors that separate Rault from Rock: (I) in Rock, the defendant was not going to testify under a
state of hypnosis, as suggested here; (2) the defendant in Rock was unable to recall the events at
issue without the hypnosis, where the defendant in this case has constantly claimed his ability to
recall the events; and (3) there was no limitation placed on the defendant's right to testify at trial).
281. See Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65 (Md. Ct. App. 1999).
282. Id. at 79.
283. Id. at 81-82.
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verdict.284
The Phillips case 28 5 mentioned above also involved an issue of the
statute of limitations with regard to bringing a claim under the repressed
memory theory. The question stemming from cases like Phillips is
whether a claim of repressed memory theory toll the statute of limita-
tions. In Phillips, the court used the words of the statute to respond to
the claim. "The statute in question is clear insofar as it allows an action
for childhood sexual abuse to be filed 'within three years of the date the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psycholog-
ical injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by
the sexual abuse.' ,,286 The court held that the looking at the plain mean-
ing of the statute, the legislature expressed its desire for the tolling of the
statute. Thus, the plaintiff's claims were timely and not time-barred.
Again, courts have not been given guidance from the Supreme
Court "on high" for this answer, so the rules vary according to the juris-
diction. In Meiers-Post v. Schafer,28 7 the court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the claim of repressed memory can constitute
insanity for the purposes of tolling the statute.288  The court also
examined if the delay discovery rule in child sexual abuse prosecutions
also applied. 89
In Bertram v. Poole, 9' the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided
that repressed memory testimony was admissible in general because it
was corroborated and also for the purpose of tolling the statute of limita-
tions.2 91 The facts of Poole concerned two plaintiffs who claimed that
284. No pun intended.
285. Discussed infra p. 1637 and accompanying text.
286. Wilson, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 256-57 (citing CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 340.1(a)).
287. 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
288. Id. at 609-10. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
The limitation period for actions for injuries to a person is three years ... Normally,
the period of limitation on the claim of a child victim does not begin to run until the
child reaches the age of eighteen... There is a section of the statute that] provides
that if a person is insane at the time her claim accrues, she has one year after the
disability is removed to bring the action although the applicable period of limitation
has run . Whether a person is insane for the purposes of the above provision is a
jury question unless it is incontrovertibly established either that the plaintiff did not
suffer from insanity at the time the claim accrued or that she had recovered from
any such disability more than one year before she commenced her action.
Id. at 608 (citations omitted). A clear problem with leaving the question of whether repressed
memory constitutes insanity involves asking novices to determine the validity and definition of a
scientific theory. This problem will be explored in detail further in this Comment.
289. Id. at 609-10. The delayed discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations where the victim
of the child sexual abuse blocks incidents from their conscious memory during the entire time of
the running of the period of limitation. Id.
290. 597 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
291. Id. at 312.
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they were sexually abused by their uncle. Both plaintiffs claimed that
they suffered from repressed memory syndrome.292 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant based on an expired statute
of limitations. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
The court allowed for the admission of repressed memory as a tool
for tolling the statute of limitations by using the data of Holocaust survi-
vors and World War II veterans that document the existence of repressed
memory syndrome. 293 The court noted that such events and occurrences
are well documented, and, therefore, the existence of repressed memory
syndrome met the standards of acceptability for the court.2 94 The prob-
lem in this case involved whether the scientific definition of the expert
witness coincided with the legal definition of repressed memory.2 95 The
court remanded the case to decide whether the repressed memory claim
was sufficient under the legal guidelines to toll the statute of limitations.
Again, the court appears to be remanding to the fact finder the issue of
what legally constitutes the theory of repressed memory to the fact
finder with no guidance from precedence and no actual knowledge of
the subject matter.
The same issue of whether a victim could be aware of some fact of
abuse and still have repressed memory syndrome arose in Clay v.
Kuhl.2 96 In Kuhl, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the statute
of limitations barred the claim because the victim was always aware of
the crime and could have brought the charges earlier.297 The court did
not allow the repressed memory claim, citing to the fact that all of the
memories were not repressed. As a result, the ability to bring the
charges existed since the actual act of abuse. The court noted that sim-
ply because the plaintiff did not remember all of the details of her abuse,
she did remember some of them, and thus had a basis for a claim before
the statute of limitations ran.2 98
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 313. "[The Minnesota] supreme court in WJL. stated that once a victim is abused
the statute of limitations begins to run because of the causal connection between the abuse and the
injury, unless there is a legal repressed memory disability..." Id. at 313 n.2.
295. Id. at 313. "Dr. Hewitt states here that repressed memory syndrome may include essential
knowledge of events that took place. That raises the question of whether the victim may suffer
from repressed memory under the legal definition. . . Because the Minnesota Supreme Court
hasn't decided a repressed memory case, what legally constitutes repressed memory syndrome
remains unclear ... "
296. 727 N.E.2d 217 (III. 2000).
297. Id. at 219.
298. Id. at 222-24.
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H. Unsure? Give It to the Judge/Jury
The method many courts have used in order to solve the issue of
reliability is often to leave it to the jury. While the jury is the fact finder
and should be given every opportunity to successfully do its job, there
are duties that the jury should not be expected to perform, especially if
the ultimate goal is for the jury to perform its duties well. Leaving the
question of the reliability of repressed memory evidence to the jury is at
best unfair. Through this action, juries are often burdened with a task
upon which the scientific community cannot even agree.
The problems with allowing jurors to answer the question of relia-
bility are numerous. First, the jury is not made up of scientists. Conse-
quently, the testimony of the expert becomes crucially important, and
equally persuasive.2 99 A juror with no knowledge of a subject will tend
to give the most credit to the expert who appears to be the most believa-
ble.3° With this, the reliability of the evidence is no longer at issue, the
expert with the most believable face is. Therefore, the jury has not per-
formed its job and the purpose of the fact finder goes unserved.
Yet another issue involves making the judge into an amateur scien-
tist. The average judge, as with the average juror, has no working
knowledge of repressed memory. Thus, she will be forced to determine
whether the information will assist the jury and whether the admittance
of the information will lead to an unfair decision, based on what she
learns from the attorneys. While this is a normal procedure for the
judge, and mandated by Daubert, this procedure should not involve an
issue upon which the scientific community cannot agree. 30 1 The very
problem with repressed memories is that the scientists do not consider
the theory reliable to any significant level of acceptance. As a result, the
judges are actually being asked to do the seemingly impossible.
Through an exact application of Daubert's requirements, it is diffi-
cult to understand why or how a trial judge as a "gatekeeper" would
allow repressed memory evidence. The scientific community says there
is a lack of falsifiability regarding the repressed memory evidence,
which precludes it from being a valid scientific theory.3 °2 Falsifiability
is believed to mean is that there is no way to prove that the results are
incorrect or false. The definition is not easy to understand and has con-
tinued to lead to confusion.30 3
299. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
300. See id. at 1250.
301. Id.
302. See McAlister, supra, note 184.
303. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Judging from the varied scientific opinions, the lack of a uniform
rule, and the recent court decisions on the matter, it is relatively easy to
conclude that repressed memory evidence is unreliable and should not
be admitted into evidence. Many of the courts that have decided to
allow repressed memory evidence have done so based on expert testi-
mony on the issue. This reasoning seems circular-the evidence alone
is not reliable enough to be admitted, but an expert's testimony about the
reliable evidence makes the evidence more reliable and thus admissible.
This begs the question, how can evidence be unreliable, but someone
who is an expert on the unreliable evidence will miraculously make the
evidence more reliable than it was before? The reasoning is illogical
and should not be employed by courts in matters concerning such seri-
ous considerations as the potential removal of an accused person's lib-
erty. The fact that the chance of the repressed memory will be actual
and accurate can be a roll of the dice, a fifty-fifty shot. This should be
enough to warrant an absolute inadmissibility until the science is more
clearly defined and better substantiated.
IV. CONCLUSION
While there is an existing theory that espouses that the courts will
begin to open the door wider with respect to prosecution-beneficial poly-
graph evidence, it is the opinion of this writer that this is not the best
route for American jurisprudence. The fact that the very people who
have studied the science of polygraphy cannot agree to any significant
extent on the reliability of the results of these tests or even on the best
method to use for testing appears to be more than enough evidence to
justify placing a hold on the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In
addition, the substantial role that the examiner plays in the interpretation
of the results coupled with the lack of uniformity regarding the qualifi-
cations of the examiners indicates that this science is not quite ready to
be introduced as evidence that determines whether someone will lose his
or her liberty.
Further, even with jury instructions, there is a significant
probability that the jury will give more weight to the evidence from the
polygraph, thereby leading to the creation of an unfair position for the
accused. Juries will probably recognize that people might be inclined to
do anything when the aspect of losing their freedom is before them. In
addition, the fact that jurors will recognize the significant interest of the
accused in the case indicates that they might be more inclined to believe
the polygraph's results. After all, the results are often what the jury con-
the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsibility.'" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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centrates on. Specifically, the jury would focus on the results that were
derived from a machine and the testimony of a third-party expert with no
interest in the outcome of the case. Thus, the polygraph evidence will
probably be given more weight than other evidence that will be
presented, in spite of indication of the results.
Another reason to postpone adoption of the admissibility of poly-
graph evidence at this time concerns the right of an accused to present a
defense. While this writer admits that polygraph evidence may be an
extremely important part of the defense presentation, the fact remains
that it is still considerably unreliable. In addition, the mere fact that the
evidence would be important if admitted should not supercede the fact
that the evidence is unreliable. It is this writer's belief that admitting
evidence that is, in and of itself, relatively suspect will not assist the trier
of fact to conclude guilt or innocence. In fact, evidence that is unrelia-
ble would serve exactly the opposite function of misleading the jury and
in fact undermine the purpose of the jury's role.
It should be inconsequential as to whom the evidence will benefit if
the evidence itself is unreliable. The precedents regarding polygraph
evidence, while hopefully circumstantial, are nonetheless alarming.
Courts should be on the same accord with their analysis and admittance
of evidence regardless if the beneficiary is the state or the defendant.
After all, justice is supposed to be blind.
As a society, we cannot afford to essentially allow a machine, capa-
ble of mistaking a nervous response for a lie or a lie for a truth, and a
person who does not have to meet any mandatory regulations for his or
her so-called expertise, to decide whether the accused loses the very
thing that we as Americans hold dear-liberty. We cannot afford to
take this risk on such a science that is still developing and is not close to
being exact. Although there are strides being made in this area, this
writer is not comfortable with chancing the liberties of the accused on a
science that is inexact and underdeveloped. The debates regarding the
admissibility of both polygraph evidence and repressed memory evi-
dence do not seem to have an end in sight. The scientific community is
completely divided over the reliability of both types of evidence and the
question of admissibility that each possesses. There are certain things
that we take for granted with regard to science, but those things usually
have the majority of scientist and students of scientists in agreement
with their existence or at least their reliability.
The experts continue to disagree on what is the best method of
polygraph examination. They also are unable to agree on whether the
interpretation of the evidence will lead to an increase in incorrect results.
More importantly, experts cannot agree that the very changes that the
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examinations record can actually be attributed to someone telling a
falsehood. If the test itself cannot be said without a doubt to accurately
test for false information, it would be negligent to use its results in any
manner, especially in a court of law.
Some argue that polygraph examinations are commonplace in
employment and even in the government. While this is true, this wide-
spread usage does not automatically equate to reliability. Further, if the
tests are questionable, it is logical to conclude that the results would be
questionable regardless of how experienced the examiner is. When free-
dom is at stake, it would be criminal to allow an uncertain methodology
to be used to reach a very certain result.
The bottom line with regard to the admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence boils down to one question: do we want to turn our system of
jurisprudence over to a machine instead of people with feelings, exper-
iences, ideas, and understanding? In the alternative, do we want a sig-
nificant portion of our ideas of justice to be based on the observations of
a person, who relies on a machine to effectively determine the guilt or
innocence of a human being? Even if polygraph evidence is supportive
of the innocence of the defendant, it is still plagued with reliability
problems, and should therefore not be allowed in as evidence. Even
with all of the safeguards of licensing examiners and checking the
machine's recording devices, the fact of the matter is that a polygraph is
still a machine, and this writer is not comfortable with having a machine
determine whether someone goes free or loses his or her freedom.
This is the reason why the Scheffer decision is not as meaningful as
it appears at first glance. The Scheffer decision held that the per se rule
of admissibility of polygraph evidence was inadmissible in the limited
context of military rules. It is apparent, however, by the opinion's lan-
guage that the Scheffer majority has a distrust of the evidence because of
its lack of reliability and verifiability. Further, because the decision was
not a close one, (Justice Stevens was the only dissenter) it is a safe bet
that if a case were to appear before the Court outside of the realm of the
military, the Court would decide it in a similar manner. The rule of per
se inadmissibility may not be allowed after Rock, but the door for the
inadmissibility of the evidence would be left open wide enough for a
Mack truck. The Court definitely decided Scheffer correctly. Perhaps at
some point science will be more conclusive with regard to the evidence
and its testing and admissibility, but that time is not here.
There are some that argue that repressed memory testimony even if
hypnotically enhanced is just as accurate as traditional memory testi-
mony. Therefore, the argument continues if the courts allow traditional
memory testimony, they should also allow testimony of repressed mem-
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ory. While it may be true that both memories are accurate, it may also
be true that both memories may be inaccurate. The difference between
the memories is that most jurors can decide the reliability of a traditional
memory for themselves because they too have traditional memories.
Many jurors are unfamiliar with repressed memories and how they are
triggered, even if they have experienced something similar.
The likelihood that the traditional memory is easier to understand
and relate to makes the decision of reliability of the witness easier. The
fact that repressed memory is presented as a scientific theory alone will
cause apprehension in jurors based on their lack of knowledge. Conse-
quently, they will give significant credibility to the expert witness who
appears confident and knowledgeable about this unfamiliar theory.
Therefore, the reliability of the witness's testimony will not be at issue.
The ability of an expert to convince the jury through confusing and
novel information will be the ultimate issue. Science has not determined
how accurate repressed memories are, but it has been determined that
repressed memories are vulnerable to change. It is unconscionable to
place a person's fate in the hands of an ignorant jury hanging on every
word of an expert who appears to know what he is talking about.
The Rock decision may have been a slight victory for the defendant
in the case, but it offered a gaping hole for other courts to disallow
repressed memory testimony. The Rock decision was intentionally nar-
row and specifically expressed that because there was no other way to
hear the defendant's story without the testimony, the Court would allow
the testimony to be admitted. In other words, if there is another way to
get the information without the repressed evidence testimony, the testi-
mony can be excluded. Further, if the defendant's right to testify is not
at stake, the testimony can also be excluded. This can be easily inter-
preted as allowing for the exclusion of repressed memory testimony
from witnesses other than the defendant. Lastly, the Court continuously
referred to its elimination of the "per se" rule. This indicates that an
analysis that avoids per se inadmissibility may very well be sufficient to
avoid a Rock problem. Indeed, the door for inadmissibility was left open
for any court that is capable of reading between the lines in Rock.
Because the scientists themselves cannot collectively say for certain
whether repressed memories are accurate, we cannot afford to allow tes-
timony based on memories that may have been planted or altered in
some significant fashion to be admitted as evidence. Further, before this
testimony should be admitted, there should be specific uniform guide-
lines that determine how long someone has before he can no longer
bring a claim. This limitation is necessary because how fair would it be
to allow a sixty-year-old woman to bring a claim of incest or molestation
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that occurred when she was sixteen-years-old? While there is sympathy
for the unfortunate events she believes she experienced, we must main-
tain a system of fairness-even for alleged molesters. Without a time
limit, this would be comparable to an open invitation to every quack in
the country to plant or suggest abusive history and constantly reap the
benefits from their "therapy sessions."
No matter how many safeguards are used, neither polygraphy nor
repressed memory evidence is certain and reliable enough to be admitted
in a court of law. The very reason for our adversarial system is to allow
those who are accused of a crime to receive a fair opportunity to prove,
through reliable means, their innocence. If the means are not reliable,
no matter how much they can assist the trier of fact, the rules regarding
evidence will not allow them to be admitted.
While this writer sympathizes with those who are accused and have
nothing other than the results of a polygraph test or their testimony of
repressed memories for their defense, the reliability of such evidence is
not up to a standard that the courts of America can embrace. This evi-
dence may one day be reliable enough to be used in a court of law, but
today, it should not be admitted simply because some within the scien-
tific community argue for its acceptance. It would be unjust for Ameri-
cans to leave the pursuit of justice in the hands of an unreliable,
uncertain, and unsubstantiated methodology that is still being tested and
developed.
YVETTE J. BESSENT
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